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Abstract: 
 
Various empirical and anecdotal accounts suggest that certain non-human animals 
behave in ways that would be considered to be moral, even exemplary, if they 
were human beings.  While some philosophers such as Mark Rowlands consider 
that some animals may be moral subjects (but not full moral agents), others (after 
Descartes) have argued that only humans possess the requisite cognitive capacities.   
Three common objections discussed in the essay are that animals (a) cannot 
reason; (b) do not have language; and (c) are not persons.  However, in the light of 
philosophers/writers such as DeWaal, Bekoff, DeGrazia and Sapontzis, it is arguable 
that these objections are questionable in themselves, and fail to dismiss the case 
for animals as moral beings.  While species membership may be relevant to the 
question, it is not decisive.  Animals do not need to be ‘persons’ or ‘moral agents’ 
to act for good, within their own communities and their individual limitations.  Such 
hard categories are arbitrary and prejudicial. 
 
In making the case for animals as moral beings, evolutionary biology and neurology 
give a persuasive account of the role that empathy and reciprocal altruism play in 
maintaining animal communities.  Darwin thought of morality as basic social 
instincts refined by intelligence.  There is good evidence (in animal play, for 
example) that their behaviour is governed by shared social obligations and 
expectations.  This contention is also supported by the similarities between the 
brains and nervous systems of humans and other animals, particularly the areas 
relating to social behaviour.  We differ from them in degree, not in kind. While 
humans can engage with moral situations in a more complex, conceptual way, this 
isn’t necessary to be moral.  Caring about, and acting for, the good of others is 
what matters morally – not the ability to follow abstract principles and rules. 
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Do non-human animals have some form of moral sense which informs the way 
that they live and act towards members of their own and other species? 
 
 
Introduction: What is behind this question? 
 
In posing this question we are not necessarily asking whether non-human animals1 
abide by some codified set of moral standards as humans commonly do, but 
whether they are ‘good-doing’ beings in any sense.  Acting morally can involve 
complex and difficult decisions, and sometimes there may be no ‘morally correct’ 
solution.  So it is understandable that some will doubt that animals can engage with 
such issues in any way at all.  If we struggle with moral matters, how can they even 
know where to start? For sceptics, then, this may be a questionable question; even 
if we credit animals with sentience, consciousness and intelligence, the very idea of 
animals as moral beings initially seems unsupportable. 
 
However, there are good reasons for asking this question.  There is a large and 
growing body of evidential material that strongly suggests that certain species – 
both wild and domestic – act in ways that parallel straightforward moral or good 
behaviour in humans.  This could, for example, be in the form of ‘a good 
temperament’ (for example, exhibiting restraint, even when provoked2) or it could 
involve responding to specific moral situations as a good person would3 – 
defending their own (or others’) young; looking after sick relatives or orphans; 
risking their own safety to save others from danger.  Taken simply on face value, 
this points us towards the possibility that at least some animals have a consistent 
sense of right and wrong or good and bad that guides their everyday behaviour. 
 
While some philosophers accept this possibility in principle, on straightforward 
empirical grounds, others maintain that animals lack ‘system requirements’ such as 
reason, complex language and metacognition which they consider to be crucial for 
dealing with moral issues.  However, there are good reasons for challenging this 
view, as I will try to show in the first half of the essay.  There are good reasons, too, 
                                                             
1 I have abbreviated this to ‘animals’ in the text for convenience, but do not mean to indicate that I 
accept the conventional animal-human distinction. Plato remarked that dividing the world into 
humans and non-humans is as silly as dividing it into cranes and non-cranes. Referenced by Stephen 
R. L. Clark, ‘Animals in Classical and Late Antique Philosophy’ in The Oxford Handbook of Animal 
Ethics, ed. by Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p.52. 
2
 It is relatively rare for animals to attack or kill without reason (ie, not related to hunting, defence 
or territory).  Captive animals such as circus elephants often endure many years of sustained cruelty 
without retaliating, when they could easily injure or kill their tormentors. 
3
 Mark Rowlands, Can Animals be Moral? (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
pp.76-77. 
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for challenging the use of putative categories such as ‘persons’, ‘moral agents’ and 
‘moral patients’, which serve to reinforce perceived divisions between humans (or 
‘persons’) and other animals on the grounds of apparent competence. 
 
From a more positive perspective, I will go on to consider various insights from 
evolutionary biology and sociobiology4 that relate to this question.  On this footing 
it is possible to see relevant similarities between the brain architecture, and 
psychophysical functions of humans and various other animals, particularly in 
connection with social interrelationships and the phenomena of empathy and 
reciprocal altruism.  The evolutionary view also substantiates the idea that any 
differences between humans and animals – including those relating to moral 
behaviour – do not present in hard categories (such as ‘moral agents’) but along an 
evolutionary continuum.  As Darwin contended, the differences between humans 
and animals really are in degree rather than in kind.5 
 
This is not to suggest that an animal’s entitlement to moral respect is determined 
by its possession of certain specified capacities such as moral agency or self-
scrutiny.6  However, if animals do have moral capacities – alongside other ‘humans 
only’ capacities such as self-awareness, reason, and communication – this raises  
serious questions about our attitude to, and treatment of them, as a number of 
philosophers referred to in this essay have said.  And here I would argue that this 
could (or should) further undermine any justification we may believe we have in 
treating animals as morally insignificant or even worthless creatures.7  Indeed, this 
debate is itself morally significant in view of the abuse and suffering that indirectly 
but ultimately proceeds from the intransigently sceptical or dismissive view of 
other sentient beings8 which has, tragically, dominated this field of enquiry since 
the times, respectively, of Aquinas and Descartes.9 
 
 
Various working definitions of morality: 
 
A particular difficulty with morality as a philosophical issue is how to define it as a 
concept:  most of us have an idea of what morality is, but may not be able to say 
                                                             
4 The study of living creatures in their social context. 
5 Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), p.95. 
6 And regardless of how ‘primitive’ or ‘worthless’ humans may consider the creature in question to 
be. This issue will be raised again further on in the discussion of personhood. 
7
 Rowlands, op. cit., p.254, and Bekoff and Pierce, op. cit., p.33. 
8
 S. F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), pp.60-
61. 
9
 David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge, New York, 
and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.17, p.73. 
8 
 
what it is without recourse to examples in practice.  With this in mind, it is worth 
trying to sketch in at least a working concept of morality before going on to see 
whether it can be meaningfully applied to animals.  It is also useful to mark a rule-
of-thumb distinction between morality and ethics, terms which may sometimes be 
used interchangeably in practice.  To act morally is not necessarily the same as 
following rules, but knowing what is right and doing it because it is the right thing 
to do.10  Morality (from ‘moré’11) is normally associated with social customs and 
obligations (which may form the basis of moral systems), while ethics (derived from 
ethos meaning ‘habits’) is normally associated with individual character (one’s 
capacity for virtue) and particularly one’s conduct towards others,12 which is itself 
grounded in, and guided by, sound judgement or wisdom – the ability to assess 
situations, weigh up the likely consequences of possible courses of action, and 
make the right ethical choice in each case.  (We will return to this in the discussion 
of Virtue Ethics later on.) 
 
Thus defined, neither term seems strictly appropriate for animals, although some 
commentators favour ethics as it is associated with one’s individual conduct (as 
opposed to governance by moral systems).  As we progress I will be referring to 
animal ‘morality’ simply as a broad convenience term for ‘good-doing’ or altruistic 
behaviour – not to imply that the case has already been made.  For now, however, 
it is worth considering one or two ‘readymade’ definitions of morality which could 
be applicable to animals.  One example is, ‘a suite of interrelated other-regarding 
behaviours that cultivate and regulate complex interactions within social groups’.13  
This may sound more like a form of functionalism rather than what we normally 
mean by morality, but it at least highlights the motivation to act in ways that foster 
co-operation and good relationships with those around us.14  Marc Bekoff makes 
this clearer when he offers another definition: ‘Morality is a spectrum of 
behaviours that share the common features of concern about the welfare of 
others’.15 
 
Some may still have doubts about this and perhaps argue that morality is more to 
do with personal integrity and a disposition to do the right thing, rather than 
charity or solicitude.  These are important things too, but there are various other 
aspects of morality, such as private religious observance, or matters of conscience 
– for example, whether it’s justifiable to tell ‘white lies’ to get out of something 
                                                             
10 Sapontzis, op. cit., p.42. 
11
 Bekoff and Pierce, op. cit., p.11. 
12
 Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics Translated, ed. by J. A. K. Thompson 
(Penguin Books, 1953), p.55. 
13
 Bekoff and Pierce, op. cit., p.7. 
14
 Ibid., p.13. 
15 Ibid., p.138. 
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we’d rather not do.  In common use, morality may also merge with such things as 
manners, thoughtfulness, and even ‘niceness’.  Additionally, the litmus test of our 
morality is what we do when we are alone and unobserved;16 and from a religious 
standpoint, what we think about others is no less significant than what we say or 
do to them, which suggests that we can be moral or immoral without anyone else 
knowing about it.  But does this mean that the definitions given above are wide of 
the mark?  And if so, where do animals fit in? 
 
One response would be that morality does arise from social interrelationships, but 
it can also include what goes on in our inward, personal world, in the sense that 
this is largely a representation of the outer world, and also in the sense that ‘the 
thought is the parent of the deed’.17  Clearly, we cannot at present know whether 
animals have equivalent mental processes, only that they also seem to act in good 
or benevolent ways.  However, we are not concerned with whether animals and 
humans are essentially the same in relation to morality, but to try and highlight 
analogous social instincts and shared expectations of behaviour, and see what part 
these may play in how we treat one another. 
 
Certainly, human morality can involve much more complex issues, which may 
require much deliberation and soul-searching.  Whether this means that the 
difference between human and animal morality is only a matter of relative 
complexity18 is difficult to determine.  However, substantive differences in 
cognitive capacity and biological characteristics between species (which delimit 
how they can or cannot act) do need to be taken into account.  One could not 
reasonably expect a lion or a shark to stop killing prey or a bonobo to practise 
monogamy (even if they could conceive of such a choice).  But this is not to 
concede that they are therefore immoral,19 nor to argue for a subjectivist or non-
cognitivist account of morality.20 As Bekoff and Pierce see it, ‘Animals don’t have to 
be moral agents in the same sense that humans are: moral agency is both species-
                                                             
16 ‘The true test of a man’s character is what he does when no one is watching’.  John Wooden, 
quoted in goodreads: <https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/23041.John_Wooden> 
Accessed 4 June 2018. 
17 Thomas Carlyle. 
18 Chardin discusses the relationship between complexity and consciousness in nature.  See Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man, translated by Norman Denny (London and New York: 
Collins; Fontana Books, 1964), p.134. 
19 For Bekoff and Pierce, an obligate predator behaves amorally when they kill their prey.  Marc 
Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), p.145. 
20
 Essentially, that morality does not consist in absolute, objective, universal truths (or ‘moral facts’) 
but is, rather, an expression of personal convictions, social norms or accepted conventions. See 
James Rachels, ‘Subjectivism’, and Michael Smith, ‘Realism’ in A Companion to Ethics, ed. by Peter 
Singer (Blackwell Publishing, 1993). 
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specific and context-specific. Furthermore, animals are moral agents within the 
limited context of their own communities’.21 
 
 
Animals: various assessments of their current moral status: 
 
The ‘moderately sceptical’ view: 
 
In the light of insights and empirical evidence from various studies of animal 
behaviour (some selected highlights of which will be referred to later, as we go), 
there is a certain degree of acceptance for the idea that animals have a range of 
cognitive capabilities that were once considered unique to humans.  Few nowadays 
wholly dismiss the idea that animals are conscious,22 sentient, able to solve 
problems, subject to emotions, and so on, which at least allows animal morality to 
be put on the table for serious discussion.  Many animal ethicists accept that 
animals have some moral standing or status, although few would agree that they 
are ‘moral agents’ (a term which will be discussed later).23 There are still 
reservations about the true extent and significance of animals’ apparently 
benevolent behaviour.   Some consider that animals can be ethically virtuous, in 
that they can act as a good person would in a similar situation,24 but they are not, 
as far as we know, consciously following an internalised system of morality.  On this 
view, human morality is wider in scope and goes further than that of animals;25 it 
makes demands on higher faculties that animals are not thought to possess. 
 
Other philosophers have expressed similar views, even before modern times: David 
Hume, for example, granted reasoning ability to animals, along with a form of basic 
proto-moral sense or sympathy, but did not consider that they have true moral 
sense or the ability to make moral judgements.26  In this respect, animals have 
been compared with children – their limitations exempt them from moral 
                                                             
21 Bekoff and Pierce, op. cit., pp.144-45 and p.147. 
22 A belief now enshrined in the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness in Human and Non-
Human Animals signed at the Francis Crick Memorial Conference in 2012.  See: 
<http://www.fcmconference.org/> Accessed 4 June 2018. 
23 David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge, New York, 
and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.199. 
24 DeGrazia, ibid., p.199.  See also Stephen R. L. Clark, The Nature of the Beast: Are Animals Moral? 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p.107. 
25
 Clark (1984), ibid., p.107; Mark Rowlands, Can Animals be Moral? (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), pp.75-77. 
26
  Julia Driver, ‘A Humean Account of the Status and Character of Animals’ in The Oxford Handbook 
of Animal Ethics, ed. by Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), p.147, p.157. 
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responsibility for their actions.27  On one hand this offers animals a certain degree 
of protection (in that it is not generally considered rational to charge and punish 
animals for ‘crimes’ that they have supposedly committed), but on the other hand, 
accepting this estimation means that animals cannot be taken seriously as moral 
beings who are entitled to certain rights, including the right not to be treated 
merely as objects or property.28 
 
One notable philosopher in this field is Mark Rowlands, who argues for at least 
some animals to be regarded as moral subjects as opposed to moral agents – a 
description which he considers can only be properly attached to human beings.  His 
definition of a minimal moral subject is presented in the following form: 
 
X is a moral subject if X possesses (1) a sensitivity to the good or bad-making 
features of situations where (2) this sensitivity can be normatively assessed, 
and (3) is grounded in the operations of a reliable mechanism (a ‘moral 
module’).29 
 
On first view this seems quite an exacting set of requirements – particularly that of 
normative assessment - which even the ‘top tier’ of the animal kingdom might 
struggle to meet.  However, Rowlands considers that the ability of animals to 
satisfy these conditions can be discovered empirically, and that ‘there is a growing 
body of evidence that supports this attribution’ – to which he adds, ‘it is likely that 
some animals will turn out to be moral subjects’.30 While he basically argues for 
animals as moral beings, he holds fast to the view that they cannot be classed as 
moral agents. 
 
Challenges: 
 
This is an issue worth looking at a bit more closely.  While Rowlands contends that 
there is a difference between moral subjects and moral agents, he also considers 
that moral agency is a spectrum, not a binary category of ‘have or have not’. Thus 
the crucial criterion for agency is the degree to which the individual understands 
(not necessarily controls, as some have insisted) the moral basis or motivation 
upon which they are acting.31  However, this is not entirely satisfactory, because it 
raises the question of where to draw the line: which animals actually qualify for this 
                                                             
27 B. A. Dixon, Animals, Emotion, and Morality: Marking the Boundary (New York: Prometheus 
Books, 2008), p.161, p.191, p.193; See also, Bekoff and Pierce, op. cit., pp.139-40. 
28
 However, in practice the Kantian notion, ‘are owed no direct duties’ is hard to distinguish from 
‘deserve no kindness’. 
29
 Rowlands, op. cit., p.230. 
30
 Ibid., pp.230-32. 
31 Ibid., p.241. 
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status, and how can we even be sure that our criteria are fair and correct?  But if 
moral agency is on a continuum, this begs the question of why we need discrete 
categories at all. However, Rowlands at least provides a carefully qualified 
argument for animal morality against a background of scepticism and doubt, to 
which he adds that if animals can or do act for moral reasons they are worthy 
objects of moral respect.32 
 
A useful example of how we can loosen these categorical constraints is provided by 
Stephen Sapontzis, who points out that, at least for ‘everyday morality’, we are not 
normally expected to provide formal explanations for our moral actions, or 
demonstrate that we know what these would be.33  And this underlines the 
difference between moral theory and moral practice, terms which tend to be 
conflated in this area of debate.  Inevitably, humans make better moral theorists, 
but theories are not essential for straightforward moral action. As Sapontzis puts it, 
‘…in most situations we simply perceive or feel what is the moral thing to do, and, 
if we are moral, do it’.34 
 
Admittedly this sounds like an overly simple characterisation, but it does seem to 
resonate with what we actually experience when we are dealing with ordinary, 
personal, moral issues.  And from this one could infer that, while morality may 
involve thinking at some level, it does not necessarily depend on the kind of 
structured reasoning involved in, say, testing the validity of a syllogism.  A helpful 
analogy can be drawn with our ability to learn our native language without 
consciously acquiring the rules of grammar, while still being able to apply those 
rules in each utterance we make.   Similarly, some people can play or compose 
music by ear, but cannot read music or explain what they are playing in a technical 
sense.  But it would make no sense to say that their performance only sounded like 
music, and could not be actual music because the performer lacked this 
understanding. To venture such an opinion in earnest would be based on little 
more than a form of exclusivism or prejudice.  And, arguably, the case against 
animals as moral beings is at least partially explicable in these terms.35 
 
If this is true, then we need to query the grounds on which some philosophers 
continue to reject the notion of animals as moral beings.  And it is apparent that 
these grounds relate closely to arguments that have been levelled at claims for 
other higher faculties or capacities in animals, namely: the rationality argument; 
the language argument, and the ‘personhood’ requirement (including self-
                                                             
32
 Rowlands, ibid., p.254. 
33
 S. F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), p.37. 
34
 Ibid., p.37. 
35
 Michael Bradie, ‘The Moral Life of Animals’ in The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, ed. by Tom 
L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.568. 
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consciousness, interests, intention and reflexivity).  These issues will be taken in 
turn, followed by opposing arguments, and then a further look at moral agency in 
the context of these considerations. 
 
 
Animals and reason: 
 
The ‘animals are not rational’ argument: 
 
A timeworn objection to animal morality is that animals are not rational beings and 
therefore cannot be moral beings either.  This position is most often associated 
with Aquinas and Descartes, who both considered that the soul was the seat of 
reason, and since (they believed) only humans have souls, only they are capable of 
self-scrutiny, sound judgement and proper moral choices.36  On this basis, 
Descartes characterised animals as mindless automatons that do not even feel 
pain, and to whom we owe neither duties nor compassion.37 It is deeply 
unfortunate for animals that this position – which managed to be both unbiblical38 
and unscientific39 – should have obtained such currency in Western thought, even 
into modern times. While it has been gradually overtaken by empirical evidence to 
the contrary, such views are still occasionally expressed, for example by writers 
such as Carruthers and Harrison who (for different reasons) do not consider that 
animals suffer pain.40 
 
We see a similar emphasis on rationality in Kant’s work on morality, where the 
focus is on the capacity to make free, rational, moral choices.  For Kant, the 
autonomy of the will is a necessary property of rational beings and ‘the supreme 
                                                             
36 See: Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp.28-54 and 
pp.123-46. 
37 Discourse on the Method Part 5.  Descartes: Key Philosophical Writings, tr. by Elizabeth S. Haldane 
and G. R. T. Ross; ed. by Enrique Chavez-Arviso (Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997), pp.106-109. 
Darwin directly contradicted this when he said that ‘close observation of creatures convinced one of 
their reasoning ability rather than instinct’. Quoted in Sapontzis, op. cit., p.33. 
38 The Hebrew word for the soul, nephesh, meaning ‘that which lives and breathes’, applies to both 
humans and animals in Genesis. (See Biblehub dictionary: 
<https://biblehub.com/hebrew/5315.htm> Accessed 4 June 2018).  Arguably, the position taken by 
Aquinas and Descartes has no mandate in the Bible.  See: Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (Urbana 
and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994), p.18, p.73, p.109, pp.127-28, p.130, p.180. 
39 It does not explain, as Voltaire said, why other creatures have senses and nervous systems like 
our own if they do not have analogous functions. Other leading thinkers, including John Locke and 
Isaac Newton came to similar conclusions against Descartes.  Referenced in: Jeffrey Masson and 
Susan McCarthy, When Elephants Weep: The Emotional Lives of Animals (London: Vintage, 1996), 
p.34. 
40
 Evelyn B. Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), pp.15-19.  As Pluhar notes, Carruthers supports 
vivisection, even if animals do suffer in the process; Harrison (on the basis of theology) believes that 
only humans can experience pain. 
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principle of morality’;41and since animals are apparently governed by instinct, this 
prerequisite of freedom effectively excludes animals from the moral realm 
altogether.42 While Kant did not consider that animals can be moral beings, he did 
not say that we are therefore entitled to harm or ill-treat them (and, indeed, to do 
so is potentially harmful to one’s own moral character) – although at the same time 
we have no direct moral obligation towards them.43 
 
Challenges: 
 
Even in the last twenty years or so, scientific research and field studies in this area 
have continued to yield an increasing body of evidence that animals behave 
rationally, intelligently and flexibly – and demonstrate competencies that challenge 
even relatively recent assessments of their abilities and limitations.  Abilities once 
tentatively associated with ‘honorary humans’ such as the great apes are now 
being observed to varying degrees in a widening range of creatures from elephants, 
pigs, sheep, octopuses, parrots, and corvids – and, more recently, chickens.  In 
short, there are no safe grounds to argue that only humans are rational; and by 
extension, there are no safe grounds to argue that creatures must be human-like to 
be rational beings.   As Mary Midgely remarks, some have argued that humans are 
not rational beings, or that they are only potentially rational.44 
 
The main issue and obstacle here has been identified by Sapontzis as the assumed 
‘normal human intelligence’ criterion and requirement for moral action, which he 
considers to be at fault.  In his view, freedom to choose versus instinct or 
conditioning is not a dichotomy but a continuum.  Animals may rely to a certain 
extent on instinct, but this does not make them automatons: various species clearly 
have the flexibility to adapt, learn and be trained to do things which may even 
surpass their apparent innate, natural behaviour.  And if some animals can make 
relatively free choices, they can also make relatively free choices that could be 
regarded as moral; they do not have to possess human-like intelligence to act in 
morally significant ways.45 
 
                                                             
41 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. by Mary Gregor and Jens 
Timmermann (Revised edn, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp.51–57. 
42 Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘Interacting with Animals – a Kantian Account’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Animal Ethics, ed. by Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), p.103. 
43
 Korsgaard, ibid., p.104. 
44
 Mary Midgley, Animals and Why they Matter (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 
1998), p.12. 
45
 S. F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), pp.38-
39. 
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At the same time, it is not in dispute that humans have powers of abstract 
reasoning that are not apparent anywhere else in the animal kingdom.  However, 
one could argue that we tend to overemphasise the role of intelligence as the 
driver of moral behaviour – what DeWaal calls ‘the myth of the wholly rational man 
or woman’.46  While there may be certain correlations between intelligence and 
the ability to conjure with theoretical moral concepts and scenarios (such as 
‘lifeboat’ or ‘trolley car’ problems), this isn’t necessarily an indication of a person’s 
moral character.  Hitler’s inner circle, for example, included highly educated and 
intelligent individuals,47and certain criminals have also been credited with high IQ 
scores.48  In other words, high reasoning ability doesn’t necessarily serve morality, 
and may often undermine it.  Conversely, we can recognise in some people – 
including those sometimes described archetypically (and perhaps patronisingly) as 
‘simple souls’ – the presentation of a kind of naïve, unschooled saintliness, a 
humbling capacity for virtues such as honesty, goodwill, charity, selflessness and 
compassion. 
 
And here, one could ask how far intelligence is really involved in ordinary, 
workaday moral living – how one actually acts for good, rather than what one says 
about it.  Is this just another example of overvaluing a general human trait simply 
because it is a human trait, a property that evidentially distinguishes us from 
‘lower’ animals?  Certainly Homo sapiens may be the cleverest animal on the 
planet, but this is to ignore more intuitive, instinctual survival capabilities and 
senses that many other animals possess; it rarely occurs to us that our prized 
mental superiority may be merely one kind of special ability among many.  David 
Hume makes a similar point concerning our natural vulnerabilities: 
 
Brute-creatures have many of their necessities supplied by nature, being 
cloathed and armed by [the] beneficent parent of all things: And where their 
own industry is requisite on any occasion, nature, by implanting instincts, still 
supplies them with the art, and guides them to their good, by her unerring 
precepts.  But man, exposed naked and indigent to the rude elements, rises 
slowly from that helpless state, by the care and vigilance of his parents; and 
having attained his utmost growth and perfection, reaches only a capacity of 
subsisting, by his own care and vigilance.49 
                                                             
46 Frans DeWaal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), p.78. 
47 Various secondary sources cite Werner Maser, The IMT Transcripts, and Nuremberg: A Nation on 
Trial, translated by Richard Barry. [Referenced in: <https://www.quora.com/What-was-Hitlers-IQ> 
Accessed 4 June 2018.] 
48
 James C. Oleson, Criminal Genius: A Portrait of High-IQ Offenders (University of California Press, 
2016). Available online at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1df4gj1> Accessed 4 June 
2018. 
49
 David Hume, ‘The Stoic’, Essays Moral, Political and Literary, ed. by Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Classics, 1987): quoted in Julia Driver, in Beauchamp and Frey, op. cit., p.151. 
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On the whole, however, we do not give fair weight to other animals’ natural 
abilities, sensitivities and even ‘super-senses’; indeed, many will deny their 
existence altogether.50 But even so, as DeGrazia notes, our increasing knowledge of 
animals’ cognitive, emotional and social complexity continues to challenge 
entrenched assumptions about human exceptionalism.51 
 
 
The ‘language requirement’ for moral agency: 
 
Animals do not have language: 
 
Aside from cognitive capacity, our capacity for language is often cited as a decisive 
property in the debate about animal morality.  Animals, the argument goes, do not 
have anything equivalent to our language with which to describe and consider 
moral issues and decisions or work with moral concepts.  In Wild Justice, Bekoff 
cites the anthropologist Terrence Deacon, who avers that, ‘While there is an 
unbroken continuity between humans and other animals, there is also a singular 
discontinuity: humans use language to communicate’ - to which Deacon adds that 
this has changed the evolution of the human brain.52 
 
It is understandable that some moral philosophers home in on language in this 
way.  As we acquire language as children, we also learn (or cannot avoid learning) 
the social context and significance of what we hear and say. Language does not 
come to us in a sterile environment of sounds and signs, such as a language lab; it is 
the medium through which we are initiated into the peculiar reality of our own 
society and culture.  And in relation to the acquisition of morality, we can draw an 
analogy with what Noam Chomsky called the ‘Black Box’ to indicate the seemingly 
effortless way in which young children come to understand the complex, 
underlying structure of language.53  Indeed, DeWaal considers that moral ability is 
parallel to language ability: in his view, we acquire and internalise it as an ‘imprint’ 
of the moral fabric of our native society.54 
 
                                                             
50 For a cogent and serious account of animal ‘super senses’, see: Rupert Sheldrake, Dogs that Know 
when their Owners are Coming Home: and Other Unexplained Powers of Animals, (London: 
Hutchinson, 1999). 
51 David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge, New York, 
and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.73. 
52 Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), p.140. 
53
 See Peter McKenzie-Brown, ‘Noam Chomsky’s Black Box’, (Studies in Energy, History and 
Language, 20 August,
 
2006):  <https://languageinstinct.blogspot.co.uk/2006/08/noam-chomskys-
black-box.html> Accessed 4 June 2018. 
54
 Frans DeWaal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), p.36. 
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However, some philosophers see this process (in the case of language or morality) 
as unique to humans.  Frey, for instance, is sceptical about animals having language 
and builds this into an a priori argument against animal morality.  Beginning with 
the proposition that ‘all and only beings that (can) have interests (can) have moral 
rights’, Frey argues (to try and indicate the most salient points without losing too 
much of the sense) that to have desires and beliefs, a being must self-
consciousness, which requires language.  But, as animals do not have language, 
they cannot have desires and beliefs; and without these things, they cannot have 
interests (and, from these, intentions); and without interests, they cannot have 
moral rights.55 And if they do not have moral rights, neither can they be moral 
agents. 
 
Challenges: 
 
The most obvious response to the assertion that animals do not have language is 
that, in its broadest sense, it isn’t true.  This is not to claim that animals necessarily 
display complex, highly structured linguistic language like our own, but to 
acknowledge how they can communicate with one another using various sounds, 
calls, signals, and body language – signifiers which are often highly nuanced.  These 
play an important part in their individual and collective survival, for example to 
share information about sources of food and water and warn one another about 
predators.56 Additionally, some animal species can learn and use57 vocal or sign-
language to communicate with human beings, as numerous studies involving great 
apes, orcas, dolphins and birds can attest.58 And in the latter case, not only can 
some animals – like Koko the gorilla or Alex the African grey parrot – describe basic 
goings on in their immediate environment, but they can also give spontaneous 
insights into their own inner states, emotions, needs, desires and preferences.59 
 
In the light of well-documented research in this area, we do not have to accept 
Frey’s claim that language is essential for beings to hold beliefs, desires or 
                                                             
55 This refers to Frey’s book, Interests and Rights – The Case Against Animals. The detailed critique 
appears in Sapontzis, op. cit., p.115 and pp.127-28.  See also, Michael Tooley, ‘Are Nonhuman 
Animals Persons?’ in The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, ed. by Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. 
Frey (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.346. 
56 Michael Bradie, ‘The Moral Life of Animals’ in The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, ed. by Tom 
L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.569. 
57 Animals appear to understand and use human syntax, rather than just repeating stock phrases. 
See: Carl Safina, Beyond Words: What Animals Think and Feel (London and New York: Souvenir 
Press, 2015), p.89. 
58
 Jeffrey Masson and Susan McCarthy, When Elephants Weep: The Emotional Lives of Animals 
(London: Vintage, 1996), p.36. 
59
 Masson and McCarthy remark about our tendency not to believe language trained animals such 
as Alex even when they do talk about their feelings. Ibid., pp.34-35. 
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intentions (and, by extension, moral feelings).60 Animals such as apes and orcas can 
learn to use language to express (among other things) desires and intentions that 
relate to their actions.  But it does not seem plausible that they did not have these 
desires and intentions before they learned this new skill. Did the chimpanzee at 
Central Washington University’s Chimpanzee and Human Communication Institute 
(CHCI) not have a desire for ‘drink-fruit’ before she coined this novel phrase to 
express her wish for some watermelon slices?61 Certainly, voicing the desire 
through language is a step up from pointing to or grabbing whatever one wants (it 
makes the whole process more ‘portable’). But it is not the signifier that gives rise 
to that desire; language is only needed to articulate a desire or belief, not to hold 
one.  We don’t normally run an inner monologue about our day-to-day actions like 
cartoon characters’ ‘thought bubbles’ before we can carry them out.62 As Sapontzis 
summarises the formal response, ‘Having desires does not require linguistic ability, 
since neither belief nor self-consciousness requires this ability’.63  And in his view, 
‘Frey fails to demonstrate that language is required for belief.  Consequently, he 
fails to demonstrate that animals cannot have belief-mediated desires’.64 
 
A similar view is taken by DeGrazia, although he goes further, with the observation 
that there are good reasons for believing that conscious animals can consciously 
remember and anticipate events, based on the need to deal with changing aspects 
of their environment in order to survive, which indicates that animals have a sense 
of time.65  (To imagine otherwise seems to invite absurd scenarios, such as a bird 
laying eggs one day and destroying them the next day on the assumption that 
some interloper had intruded into her territory overnight.)  And, for DeGrazia at 
least, on the basis that various animals have desires and beliefs that explain their 
actions (and are capable of making choices66), it follows that these animals are 
agents67 - although it should be noted that DeGrazia, who favours a gradualist 
account of agency, does not claim that they are therefore fully-fledged moral 
agents.68 
  
                                                             
60 David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge, New York, 
and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.4-5. 
61 Referenced by Lauren Kosseff in ‘Primate Use of Language’ (Tufts University, Animals, Cognition 
and Learning, 2013) at: <http://pigeon.psy.tufts.edu/psych26/language.htm> Accessed 4 June 2018. 
62 Michael Tooley, ‘Are Nonhuman Animals Persons?’ in The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, ed. 
by Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.346. 
63 Sapontzis, op. cit., pp.115, pp.119-120. 
64 Ibid., pp.127-128, p.130. 
65
 DeGrazia, op. cit., p.170. 
66
 As DeGrazia reiterates elsewhere in the book.  (Other writers also make this important point:  for 
example, Bekoff and Pierce, op. cit., p.145.) 
67
 DeGrazia, ibid., p.172. 
68
 DeGrazia, ibid., p.73.  DeGrazia considers, for example, that ‘dolphins and great apes quite 
arguably demonstrate as much moral agency as, say, the moderately retarded’. (sic)  Ibid., p.71. 
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The question of belief can, to a degree, also be addressed by straightforward 
observation of animal behaviour, such as Wittgenstein’s example that a dog 
believes his master is at the door.69  Another example is wild animals’ almost 
universal ‘fear and dread’70 of humans - a perception (arguably a justifiable belief) 
that humans are dangerous.71  What is remarkable here is that many animals know 
about this danger even when they have not directly experienced it themselves.  
Somehow, the default protocol, ‘run away now ‘ is shared between them in ways 
that we do not yet fully understand, but it seems likely that they use their 
repertoires of calls to this end – as is suggested by experiments with crows at The 
University of Washington.72 
 
Human language and its limitations: 
 
If, as it seems, intelligence has been overemphasised as a requirement for moral 
agency, it can equally be said that linguistic philosophers have put too much 
emphasis on language as a prerequisite for intelligence, and tend to reject research 
into animal cognition that contradicts this view.73 
 
However, even if it were true that animals do not have language at all, it would be 
possible for them still to get by without it.  For example, customs such as queuing, 
shaking hands, and other human behaviours would still give us a clue how to 
behave, even if we did not have speech.  Likewise, young children and animals can 
articulate their wants and aversions without using spoken language; apart from 
vocalisation, both humans and animals display various kinds of gestures, body-
language, and facial expressions, which can be read by other animals; indeed some 
animals can read human body language better than we can ourselves.74 Such a 
degree of natural sensitivity and acuity suggests that complex, spoken language is 
not necessarily a decisive factor in managing ordinary, everyday situations.  It’s 
possible to be moral without talking about it. 
                                                             
69 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tr. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, 
1958), p.174.  Also referenced in Mary Midgley, Animals and Why they Matter (Athens, Georgia: The 
University of Georgia Press, 1998), p.57.  See also Clark (1984), op. cit., p.23. 
70 Genesis 9:2 
71 With some exceptions. As Darwin found in the Galapagos Islands, various animal species that had 
never encountered humans before were naturally unafraid of people.  For an interesting, general 
account see: Delthia Ricks, ‘Fear Takes a Holiday: Animals of Galapagos Islands Appear to Lack That 
Instinct’ (Los Angeles Times, October 9, 1988):  <http://articles.latimes.com/1988-10-09/news/mn-
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72 See: John M. Marzluff and Tony Angell, ‘How Crows Recognize Individual Humans, Warn Others, 
and Are Basically Smarter Than You’ (Popular Science, 6 June, 2012):  
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This is not to say that human language is not a huge evolutionary advantage for 
humans.  It is virtually indispensable for communicating abstract thoughts, complex 
ideas and narratives, and can help us to clarify complex issues such as those 
involved in moral judgement, and particularly competing moral choices but it is not 
necessarily the key to moral practice, and nor is it a guarantee of the moral quality 
or truth of whatever thoughts we wish to express; indeed, it can facilitate 
deception, rationalisation, obfuscation and distortion of our sense of right and 
wrong.  While it may be argued that, without language, animals are trapped in their 
own environments and psychological limitations, humans are similarly limited by 
the very thing that we believe makes us free – our self-created ideational and 
ideological environment, the ‘prison house of language’ that underpins virtually 
everything we are and do as a species.75 
 
 
The ‘personhood’ argument: 
 
Animals are not persons: 
 
A controversial concept-category associated with both rationality and language 
with important implications for questions of animal morality is that of ‘persons’.  If 
some animals satisfy the criteria for personhood, it is easier to make a case for 
them as moral beings; if they do not satisfy those criteria, it is easier to dismiss the 
case on that basis.  For that reason, this section will consider arguments for and 
against animals as persons, before going back to the main discussion concerning 
animal morality. 
 
Personhood is an ascribed status which depends on certain crucial human or 
human-like capacities which include consciousness, sentience and higher cognitive 
functions such as self-awareness, reflexivity (or metacognition)76 and a sense of 
self-identity persisting through time.  Some philosophers argue that only humans 
can fulfil all the necessary criteria needed to be full persons, while others consider 
that certain high-functioning animals such as chimpanzees or dolphins might also 
qualify.  Animals are not persons (sceptics will argue), because their cognitive 
abilities are insufficiently developed to provide anything more than a very basic 
                                                             
75 A phrase commonly attributed to Nietzsche (but which may have been mistranslated). See:  
Language Log, ‘Citation crimes and misdemeanors’ (sic), September 9, 2017, filed by Mark Liberman 
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apprehension of the world and their place in it.  And this deficiency, they contend, 
also means that their interests are restricted to immediate goings on; they are not 
able to think about the possible future, or their continuing existence within it, and 
nor can they consider alternative futures that would ensue from this or that 
decision at this or that point in time.77 
 
Perhaps most decisively, however, sceptics will argue that animals cannot reflect 
on and evaluate their options and motives for whatever judgements and decisions 
they might make – a requirement that is considered essential (by Kant, among 
others) for a being to have proper moral awareness, and without which they 
cannot be moral agents.78  Even an outspoken champion of animal cognition such 
as Darwin considered that only humans can reflect on their own thoughts and 
behaviour in the form of conscience and regret.79 (Although this assertion has since 
then been challenged by empirical evidence to the contrary.80) While this view 
doesn’t quite dismiss animals as automatons, it credits them with little else that 
might lift them out of this category.  One significant consequence of this view is 
that, again referring back to Kant, animals are not able to improve their 
environment, or to try to be ‘better’ in themselves, as morally-aware humans can.  
While they may be capable of behaving virtuously, they do not have moral ideals or 
the ability to realise them.81 We will look again at this point in the final section. 
 
Challenges: 
 
Historically, the concept of personhood has tended to work exclusively rather than 
inclusively in relation to animals, and indeed it is questionable whether it should be 
                                                             
77 Sapontzis points out that ‘the future’ includes the immediate future; that is, knowing what one is 
going to do next – not necessarily long-term plans or goals. (Which I take to imply that one cannot, 
therefore, deny interests to animals on this basis.)  S. F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), pp.130-31. 
78 Sapontzis, ibid., p.40. 
79 James Rachels, Created from Animals: the Moral Implications of Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990) [Accessed online on 4 June 2018: <http://www.jamesrachels.org/>], p.161; 
and Bekoff and Pierce, op. cit., p.147.  There have also been ‘internalisation of rules’ experiments 
with rats and dogs, which suggest that animals can become extremely distressed when they realise 
that they have done something wrong or caused harm. See Frans DeWaal, Good Natured: The 
Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), p.106; and DeGrazia, op. cit., pp.207-208. 
80 Rats can regret a choice of food upon realising that they could have chosen something better, 
according to experiments conducted by the University of Minnesota in 2014 and Reported in Nature 
Neuroscience by Steiner and Redish, (Vol. 17, 2014), 995–1002.  For a non-technical account see, 
‘Rats Shown to Feel Regret Over Bad Decisions’ by Zoe Gough (BBC Nature News, 8 June 2014):  
<www.bbc.co.uk/nature/27716493> Accessed on 4 June 2018. 
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 Kant does not recognise naturally kind people as fully moral: ‘they merely follow their own 
nature’. Referenced in Sapontzis, op. cit., pp.43-44. 
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used in animal ethics at all.82  And as Sapontzis wryly characterises the situation, 
the concept of personhood, in effect, ‘protects “persons” from the selfish 
tendencies of humans and helps to justify treating “non-persons” selfishly’.83 
 
However, we do not have to accept the presumptive claim that animals generally 
do not experience themselves as persisting entities with a past and a future, or as 
beings with interests of some kind.  (Sapontzis considers that it is ‘irresponsible’ to 
suggest that only humans can comprehend the world and take an interest in 
things.84)  Domesticated animals and pets, for example, demonstrate both memory 
and anticipation of events that affect them (for example, feeding time, walks, visits 
to the vet, holiday boarding) which they may react to with evident excitement or 
dread, depending on their prior experience.85 And there are numerous accounts of 
similar behaviour in various other species; indeed, Sapontzis argues that all 
sentient animals have preferences – and that there would be no evolutionary point 
in being sentient if a being were unable to seek pleasure and avoid pain.86 
 
Although we cannot prove that animals generally have some form of basic self-
awareness, arguing that they have not entails various conundrums concerning their 
day-to-day existence.  It is essential, for instance, for a creature to be able to 
distinguish between its own physical body from the world ‘out there’, if it is to 
avoid nonsensical mishaps such as a dog not knowing the difference between a 
bone from the butcher and a bone in his own leg.87 A species with such limited 
powers of discernment would probably die out very quickly, which suggests that 
this basic form of self-awareness may be common to the whole animal kingdom.88 
The notion of ‘merely conscious’ animals is problematic as well, in that receiving 
impressions from the environment without the animal being conscious of itself as 
the recipient of those impressions (known as the ‘transcendental unity of 
apperception’) would make its experience of the world chaotic and incoherent89 – 
if it could be said to exist at all in any meaningful sense. 
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Admittedly, the basic sense that ‘I am here’ is not in itself a sufficient qualification 
for moral agency, but it is, arguably, sufficient to qualify a being for moral 
standing;90 and if this sense is present to some extent in most creatures, the notion 
of an absolute dichotomy between humans (fully capable of reflexivity) and other 
animals (wholly incapable of reflexivity) becomes untenable.  In this case, we can 
posit a continuum between (roughly) ‘here is a feeling that I am’ and ‘here I know I 
am’; self-awareness isn’t zero-sum but presents in varying degrees and forms.91  
And here we may be premature in denying metacognition to animals altogether, if 
one considers the significance of the fact that animals are sometimes seen to be 
uncertain what to do in a situation, which suggests that they are trying to assess 
their options – a process that would seem to indicate the kind of reflexive ‘thinking 
about thinking’ mentioned earlier.92 And a now very familiar indicator of the upper 
end of this scale is the Gallup mirror-test, whereby animals such as chimpanzees, 
elephants and orcas demonstrate that they can recognise themselves in their own 
reflections (grooming or inspecting themselves), rather than attacking what they 
perceive as another animal looking back at them, as cats or dogs may do.93  
Remarkably, ants also seem to recognise their own reflections and react similarly 
(again, by grooming, for example) in the same experimental situation.94 
 
Not all will be convinced by this phenomenon alone; but when it is coupled with 
the fact that language-trained apes or African grey parrots can refer to themselves 
as the subject of statements concerning their wants, preferences, feelings, and 
activities95 - that is, they seem to recognise themselves as discrete, continuing 
entities - it is difficult to see how the sceptical view of animal self-awareness can be 
maintained, at least with regard to animals at that level of cognitive sophistication.  
It’s also useful to remember that even humans have to learn how to decode 
mediated images.  Indeed, some anthropological studies describe how members of 
certain remote tribes did not recognise themselves in mirrors, videos, or 
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photographs until researchers helped them to ‘match up’ their corresponding 
features.96 
 
A related and important capacity which has also been inferred from animal 
behaviour is what is generally known as a theory of mind (sometimes called ‘mind-
reading’): the understanding that other beings have perceptions and inner 
processes like mine (and thoughts like or unlike mine)97 that enable them to 
observe, register, and act upon what I am doing.  This is an advantage in 
evolutionary terms in that knowing that others might be watching where I have 
stashed food for the winter means that I can take pre-emptive action to stop them 
stealing it, for example by pretending to hide it in one place and then hiding it 
somewhere else later on when no one is looking.  This sort of craftiness has been 
observed in animals such as apes, dolphins and elephants.  Crows, which are 
increasingly credited with primate-like intelligence, also seem to have this ability.   
In a simple, pragmatic sense, it suggests that certain animals know what thinking 
is.98 
 
The argument from marginal cases: 
 
A familiar line of defence against the notion of personhood as a precondition not 
just for moral agency but even for a right to life (within the utilitarian view, and 
value theory, particularly) is the argument from marginal cases, which warrants a 
brief section of its own here.  The argument points to the fact that setting a 
minimum standard for personhood which effectively excludes all but functionally 
normal adult humans on grounds of capacity also disqualifies certain incapacitated 
humans from personhood as well.99  This category of non-persons would include 
humans with serious and life-limiting cognitive disabilities, and very young children.  
This leads to an awkward inconsistency, in that humans in this category currently 
enjoy the same rights as full persons.  To be consistent and fair, both human and 
non-human ‘non-persons’ would have to be denied such rights, or both categories 
would have to be granted such rights.100 For more on the argument from marginal 
cases, but with reference to the principle of equality rather than rights, see Peter 
Singer, Animal Liberation.101 
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Some have objected to the use of extreme cases in this way on the grounds that 
such limitations do not undermine the general fact of human superiority over 
animals;102 they are in effect, the exception that proves the rule. (And one might 
also argue that people in this situation do not have exactly the same rights in 
practice as normal persons because their limitations would formally debar them 
from doing such things as, say, serving on a jury, or running for Presidential office.)  
However, this comparison rests, I think, on a false characterisation of animals: 
being an animal is not a disability! They are not impaired or ‘failed’ humans.  Yes, 
animals are limited in various ways that humans are not (the opposite is also true); 
but they are able to thrive in the wild without aid, which demands keen senses and 
flexible intelligence – the ability to learn, remember, anticipate, adapt, plan.103  On 
this basis, it is wrong and unfair to place animals on the same footing as seriously 
disabled humans; and it is even more unfair and unjust to use animals’ perceived 
‘disabilities’ as a pretext to exploit them, and indeed to rob them of their lives.104 
 
 
The moral agency argument: 
 
If animals are not persons they don’t qualify as moral agents either: 
 
Taking the three main areas outlined above – reason, language, and personhood - 
we can begin to see how these concepts converge on, and set up the parameters 
for, moral agency – the threshold requirements for which include (as summarised 
by Bekoff) flexibility, plasticity, emotional complexity and particular cognitive 
skills.105  But while some philosophers have sought to create precise and credible 
definitions of the criteria and qualifications needed for moral agency, these do not 
help to determine which particular animals possess these qualities.  How do we 
distinguish in practice between those who are ‘moral agents’, ‘moral patients’ and 
‘moral subjects’ – the latter being the preferred term provided by Rowlands (which 
– as I read it – suggests something between patients and agents)?106 
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The term ‘moral subjects’ seems preferable to ‘moral agents’ as the latter term is 
problematic in various ways: it leads to an all-or-nothing category, in which a being 
is either a fully-fledged agent who makes moral decisions that impact on others, or 
a wholly passive entity subject to the influence and impact of such decisions.  
Agents, unlike patients, are responsible (entailing praise and blame) for both good 
and bad deeds.  And, as was raised earlier, since animals cannot be culpable, on the 
basis that they are generally not equipped to make moral judgements, their good is 
essentially passive in that they cannot work to improve their own moral natures or 
reform their own societies.107  They cannot be truly moral beings because they are 
not trying to fulfil an ideal way of life.108 And if they are not moral agents, on this 
view, they fall foul of the mooted ‘reciprocity requirement’ (which links to the 
previous discussion of Frey): that is, ‘only moral agents are entitled to moral 
rights’.109 
 
Challenges to moral agency as a category: 
 
However, to deal with the foregoing points in order (roughly):  the business of 
defining and determining the currency of categories such as moral agents, moral 
patients and moral subjects tends to obscure an overarching problem to do with 
categories in themselves; we are too busy trying to apply them to stop and 
question whether we should be doing so at all.  By accepting these categories, we 
are in danger of making them real entities, or more real than the living creatures 
which they are claimed to define.  At present we simply do not know enough about 
the true cognitive capacities and capabilities of various species of animals to be 
able to say for sure whether they are able to act morally or to understand what 
morality means, but this has not stood in the way of labels and categories being 
assigned on the mere assumption that they cannot – giving them, in other words, 
the disbenefit of the doubt. 
 
One could also refer back to the argument from marginal cases as a just response 
to the specific contention that being a moral agent implies the performance of 
duties (which then keeps animals out of the equation): again, if some humans are 
so incapacitated that they cannot perform duties but are still classed as moral 
agents, then, likewise, it would be inconsistent not to extend this privilege to 
animals as well,110 if we still considered moral agency to be a viable category.  
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However, there is no reason why full moral agency should be required for one to 
be recognised as a moral being111 – other qualities such as compassion and loyalty 
can be more important.112  A capacity for moral scrutiny doesn’t guarantee perfect 
moral decisions.  And it’s not always about reason.  Emotions and ‘instinct’ are 
important factors too,113as will be discussed further on. 
 
This is not to say that terms such as ‘agents’, ‘patients’ and ‘subjects’ are 
meaningless, but that we do not know for sure whether such categories can be 
applied to animals in any meaningful way, and for this reason it is arbitrary to apply 
them as we have seen in much of the literature.  The term ‘moral agent’ lends a 
spurious accreditation where it is applied, as though it were describing a lifetime 
status (or vocation) when, really, it merely describes what we think a person (or 
other being) may be capable of doing in certain situations.  For instance, I might 
hang wallpaper and paint the doors at home, but I would not then call myself a 
painter and decorator, even if I did these jobs to a professional standard.  And in a 
similar way, I might deal with some moral issue or other today, but this is no 
indicator of what I will or will not do (or be able to do) on other occasions, or even 
whether I will ever perform another morally significant act.  So what I would want 
to suggest is that I would only be moral in the course of acting in a moral way, and 
could only be judged on that basis; at all other times I could only be described as a 
potentially moral being. 
 
This may sound like hair-splitting, but I think that the attributive use  of  moral 
‘agents’, ‘patients’, ‘subjects’, and so on, as they are at present, is problematic.  
Probably the most unhelpful aspect of the moral agency account is that it keeps the 
focus on the agent, rather than facts relating to the apparently virtuous act.114 But 
what makes the doer more important than the deed?  What is it about the imputed 
deficiencies, proficiencies or potential of the individual(s) involved that determines 
what act has taken place?  Admittedly, humans can have ulterior motives for 
performing good acts, but it is arguable that the act itself is still good;115however, 
instances of animals’ behaviour that emulate the actions of a virtuous person 
should, I believe, be considered as virtuous actions in a de facto sense unless and 
until we have certain knowledge to the contrary.  We would then observe that this 
or that animal did a good or a kind thing, in the same sense as we might say that 
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this or that person painted the front door of the house across the road.  We would 
not normally insist on knowing whether the door-painter was (a) a fully qualified 
professional decorator, and (b) what their motives were, before agreeing that the 
door had indeed been painted.116 
 
The somewhat simplified outline of the moral agency requirement given above 
contains all the elements of what we could call an ‘exclusivity trap’: that is, to 
identify a given property or entitlement, and then produce various explanations as 
to why only certain parties can have those properties, entitlements or abilities.117 
On this view, the moral agency requirement is itself a product of unproven 
assumptions and anthropocentric bias.118  As Darwin succinctly phrased it, 
‘Animals, whom we have made our slaves, we do not like to consider our equals’.119 
 
This is not to say that prejudice is the only reason for denying moral agency to 
animals, but it does indicate something of the attitudes behind the idea that it is 
self-evidently absurd to include animals within the scope of moral agency.  And one 
can also see how problematic it would be (for humans) if this kind of scepticism 
were to be discredited altogether.  For, if animals do have desires, beliefs and 
intentions that explain their actions (as is suggested by study of language trained 
apes at the very least), one can argue for them as moral beings.  And on that basis, 
we could no longer deny them their moral rights. As DeGrazia says, ‘…extending 
equal consideration to animals would be highly revisionist, tearing much of the 
fabric of popular and moral thought’.120 
 
What seems to be required here, if we are to discuss the capacities of human and 
nonhuman animals on a more level playing field, is some kind of common 
denominator; and for this we will now need to turn to the role of evolutionary 
theory. 
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Neurology/physical evolution: 
 
The kinds of field-based observations and narratives regarding animal behaviour 
outlined in various places in this essay are not only interesting in themselves, but 
also highly significant in the way that they seem to be in line with indications from 
research into animals as evolving organisms at the cellular and genetic levels.  As 
biological beings, we share with other animals an astonishing range of common 
features and functions.  As well as the underlying functional similarities 
(‘evolutionary universals’) between human anatomy and other animals - for 
example, the arrangement of limbs, the configuration of bones in hands, wings and 
flippers, the circulation of blood, the main organs of sense (including the ability to 
feel pain), the mechanisms of oxygenation, digestion and reproduction, and so on - 
we also find that the basic neurophysiological functions are very similar (in virtually 
all multicellular animals).121 
 
There are also remarkable similarities in cognitive functioning between humans 
and other species (even allowing for different degrees of sophistication).  It appears 
that cognitive evolution does not reinvent the wheel, and ‘works with rather than 
replaces the ancient emotional infrastructure’.122  Thus, the human brain is a 
product of evolution – larger and more complex but essentially similar to nervous 
systems of other mammals:123 a fact that can be pressed further still in the light of 
Paul MacLean’s theory of ‘the triune brain’, which holds that the human brain 
comprises more primitive structures known as the reptilian brain, the old 
mammalian brain, and the new mammalian brain (the basal ganglia, limbic system 
and neocortex, respectively), which he also associates with the sense of self.124 Of 
particular interest here is the discovery of ‘mirror’ and ‘spindle’ neurons in the 
brain – features which, again, are common to humans and various other kinds of 
animals – and which some believe are associated with social emotions such as 
sympathy and empathy.125  In the light of such similarities in neurological make-up 
across species, as Bekoff notes, ‘it is likely that a suite of social behaviours has co-
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evolved in social mammals’;126 and even the essential Christian virtue of 
forgiveness, it has been contended, is also a complex biological adaptation.127 
 
While these discoveries by themselves are not (and do not claim to provide) proof 
of cognitive or moral parity between humans and other animals, they are relevant 
in a number of ways, and help to rebut some of the stronger claims made by 
apologists for anthropocentricism, such as the idea that only humans can feel pain, 
grief, empathy, love or loss – a position given short shrift by Voltaire in his critique 
of Descartes, when he asked, rhetorically, ‘are animals fully equipped to feel so 
that they may not  feel?’128 It is also helpful in that it provides a theoretical 
underpinning for direct comparisons between humans’ and other animals’ inner 
workings in the form of the ‘inductive analogy to other minds in relation to 
biologically similar beings’.129  We have, in other words, a reasonable basis upon 
which to believe that similar behaviours (between humans and animals) are likely 
to arise from similar states and perceptions, including some kind of moral or ethical 
sense. 
 
 
The empirical view: evolutionary biology, sociobiology and cognitive ethology: 
 
We should not forget along the way that the case for animal morality hasn’t just 
appeared out of nowhere:  the proposition exists because, now that we have the 
technology to study animals more closely and exhaustively than ever before it is 
increasingly apparent that they can act in ways that, if duplicated by humans, 
would be considered eminently decent, tolerant, good and fair, at least for most of 
the time (although, of course, we should not airbrush out their bad behaviour130).  
Indeed, they often seem to demonstrate what we would call noble characteristics 
such as devotion, courage and self-sacrifice131 in the course of what Shapiro refers 
to as paradigmatic instances of moral behaviour.132  In simple terms, their actions 
seem to indicate beings who actually care about one another.  And, in DeWaal’s 
view, ‘[this] capacity to care for others is the bedrock of [our] moral systems’.133 
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There have been a number of ground-breaking field observations of wild animals, 
going back to the pioneering work of scientists such as Jane Goodall, which have 
now grown into a new genre of scientific accounts and engrossing narratives that 
reveal the day-to-day personal lives, dramas and traumas of animals in ways that 
continue to surprise and amaze us.134  Nowadays, a wealth of long term and 
immersive studies of animal social groups and relationships between animals such 
as great apes, dolphins, wolves, elephants and wolves, among others confounds 
the ‘mindless automatons’ view and force us to review all that we thought we 
knew about such species in the past. 
 
What should surprise us, perhaps, is that we are so surprised about such 
revelations.  In the mid nineteenth century, Darwin considered from his own 
observations that higher animals have emotions and cognitive abilities akin to our 
own, but different only in degree and complexity.135And in line with this, he 
thought of morality in humans as an extension of basic social instincts (such as 
sympathy) and behaviour refined by intelligence.136 
 
The evolution of animals’ moral behaviour in relation to communities: 
 
Within evolutionary theory, then, morality is closely related to social ties and 
interrelationships among both humans and other animals; it is necessary and 
functional in keeping social groups together and flourishing.  There is good 
evidence for this in relation to social mammals such as the great apes 
(chimpanzees, for example, take ‘sides’ in arguments and try to intervene and stop 
them)137 and orcas, but is not necessarily restricted to them.  In Darwin’s schema, 
such abilities are graduated between species in the form of evolutionary continuity, 
which accords very well with the wider theory of evolution: the progressive 
continuation of various beneficial traits from species to species – rather than clear-
cut distinctions or ‘stepped’ categories.138 And if this is indeed how nature works, 
then even just this one phenomenon should at least make us very cautious in 
applying definitive categories to animal species on the basis of outdated and 
unsound assumptions concerning their perceived cognitive abilities. 
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Various other commentators have homed in on the importance of community 
here, arguing that the evolution of moral behaviour is tied to the evolution of 
society – and by extension, ‘social complexity is a marker for moral 
complexity’,139while social inclusion is essential to human morality.140  And, 
importantly, this appears to present itself in a consistent, ordered fashion within 
given social groups of mammals (and possibly others).  Creatures living in close 
social groups, particularly primates, seem to live by shared, unspoken codes of 
conduct based on fairness and unfairness, which are approved and punished by, for 
example, being ostracised, ignored or rebuked, as chimps are when they have 
refused to share food in the past but now want to claim a share themselves.141 At 
the same time, however, it is important to acknowledge that (according to some 
sources) over ninety per cent of interactions among primates are friendly rather 
than violent or aggressive.142 
 
Reciprocal altruism: 
 
This kind of phenomenon among social animals has been characterised as altruistic 
or prosocial behaviour.143  It has to be noted, however, that biologists are here 
using altruism in the special sense of other-directed behaviour that ultimately 
benefits the whole group,144 and is not necessarily the same as the kind of selfless 
moral actions that we tend to associate with the human equivalent.  At the same 
time, however, researchers speak in literal terms about social animals displaying 
empathy or reciprocal altruism to one another, certainly among primates.  
Chimpanzees, for example, do favours for one another and expect fair play in 
return – and get very upset when this does not happen.145 
 
There is also increasing scientific evidence that various other animals have a similar 
capacity for empathy and helping behaviour or altruism.146 One of the examples 
that Darwin used to illustrate this was that of crows feeding their old or blind 
companions.147 Similar acts of kindness have also been observed at various times 
among other social animals. Among other examples, Bekoff refers to ‘The Case of 
the Midwife Bat’ (documented in The Journal of Zoology), in which an apparently 
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inexperienced pregnant bat was assisted by one of her roof-mates to give birth to 
her young. 148 Bekoff also notes that ‘even rodents’ demonstrate empathy – 
inferred from experiments in which mice not only become distressed when seeing 
a cage-mate suffering pain, but also become more sensitive to pain themselves.149 
The mice also seem to act as though they have empathy for one another when they 
are distressed in some way.150 Rats, likewise, help out their ailing and weaker 
brethren, and even assist strangers (if they have themselves been helped in the 
past) – a form of behaviour once thought to be uniquely human.151 In some cases 
such behaviour goes beyond kindness to self-denial or even self-endangerment. 
Rats in experiments chose to release other rats imprisoned in a tube, suspended in 
a harness, locked in a water-filled compartment, or otherwise endangered or 
distressed, rather than press a lever to deliver a treat for themselves.152 Rhesus 
monkeys in laboratory experiments refused to press a food-delivery lever for many 
days, risking starvation, after realising that this gave electric shocks to other 
monkeys (in re-runs of the controversial Stanley Milgram ‘obedience to authority’ 
experiments using rather more compliant humans).153 
 
And, for Bekoff, if animals do have this capacity for empathy, this raises ‘the 
significant possibility that they have in place the cornerstone of what in human 
society we know as morality’.154 And it seems that the kind of altruism illustrated 
above can cross the species divide, for instance in situations where dolphins 
apparently rescue human swimmers who are in trouble,155or the case related by 
Safina concerning a group of elephants who, upon discovering a woman stranded 
overnight in the bush, collected heavy branches to create a sort of shelter for her, 
thus protecting her from other wild animals.156 Such behaviour is hardly beneficial 
to the elephants, and it is hard to explain it without defaulting to empathy and 
altruism, or indeed simple kindness. 
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Reciprocal altruism (described as ‘a complex mechanism based on the 
remembrance of favours given and received’) allows co-operation to extend 
beyond immediate kin and out to the whole of one’s social group.157 And this 
multilateral form of altruism or ‘favour bargaining’ is what (according to DeWaal) 
eventually evolved into the Golden Rule – the ancient idea that we should treat 
others as we would wish to be treated ourselves.158 
 
While evolutionary biologists consider that biological altruism is genetically 
underpinned, and benefits the social group overall, this could in theory work 
against the ‘survival of the fittest’ principle.  A genetic disposition towards self-
sacrifice could, conceivably, weed-out the strong (those able to help) and 
encourage the weak (those needing help).159  As far as we know, this has not 
happened, as reciprocal altruism has not died out.  Possibly it means that more 
members of the group survive overall, regardless of their individual fitness to live 
(according to value theory criteria). So, as this view seems to imply, it might be that 
the prosocial value of altruism consists in incidental, side-benefits arising from 
some other motive for acts of kindness within social groups.   One might say that 
virtue really is its own reward, even among nonhumans; where we look for 
biological or ulterior motives for acts of kindness we may be missing the simple 
possibility that other animals express kindness because (to repeat the point) they 
really do care about one another. 
 
To shift perspective slightly, we can enjoy a privileged view of animal morality 
through the observation of animals at play in their natural state. Here it is possible 
to identify ‘rules of play’ in behaviour patterns in animals that seem to be based on 
role-reversal or neutrality, restraint, fairness/unfairness, and approval/disapproval 
by others.160 Such rule-governed frolicking has been observed in the wild in various 
animals such as chimpanzees and bonobos, as well as wolves and hyenas.161   They 
can modify their behaviour according to context and engage in spontaneous role-
play, which suggests they have both self-awareness and self-control.162  If they did 
not, it is hard to see how mature animals could rein in their normal adult behaviour 
in this way so as to avoid injuring or killing juveniles or their younger siblings.  To do 
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this, they need to be able to stand back from their normal viewpoint and become 
objectively aware of what they are doing before they can adopt a role in the game 
(‘look, I’m being a puppy like you’, in effect).  And while they are playing, they also 
need to remain aware that ‘I am the one who is now pretending to be somebody 
else’, before they can resume their normal state or identity afterwards (‘I am now 
back to the “me” that I normally am’). 
 
Of course one cannot be sure what kind of thought processes are involved, but it is 
hard to see how this behaviour could occur automatically, or in the absence of 
some kind of self-consciousness.  That it happens at all is highly significant, I think, 
and runs counter to the notion that other animals do not or cannot stand back and 
check or change their behaviour when necessary.  Indeed, play has been 
characterised as a window into animal morality163 – showing us how animals know, 
and adapt to, what is required in this interactive situation rather than that one.  
And if this is the case, it lends some support to the view that at least some animals 
are capable of self-reflexivity, and through that, socially adjusted and ethically 
meaningful behaviour. 
 
 
Animals’ emotional lives – relevance to moral behaviour: 
While we can, hopefully, accept that biological altruism pays dividends in the long-
term good of the social group overall (animals don’t routinely kill one another over 
scraps of food, or out of spite, for example), there is some difficulty in explaining 
their motive.  What it is that makes them behave altruistically as individuals?  What 
do they get out of it? How does this impulse present itself to them in their inner 
psychological world? 
Earlier on, we noted that sceptics maintain that animals lack the cognitive power 
required to work out a sound moral action on a rational, intentional footing.  This 
may or may not be true, but if we concede the point, then we need to look for 
some other explanation.  And the next-best candidate here seems to be emotion – 
a drive which we normally do not, or cannot, reason with or against.   There are 
good reasons for attributing emotion to other animals: not only do they present 
displays and behaviours that also characterise human emotions, but they also 
undergo measurable psychophysical changes such as increased heart-rate, pupil 
dilation, hormonal changes, and so on, which are similar to the indicators of 
emotional states and feelings in human beings.  There seems to be no good 
scientific reason for denying this similarity,164 and indeed we should now be placing 
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the onus firmly on sceptics to prove that these impulses are anything other than 
what they appear to be. 
The implication of emotions as drivers of moral actions fits in well with the 
evolutionary equipage of other animals and supports the idea of morality being 
somehow ‘hardwired’ into the brain and giving rise to certain concomitant physical 
processes; indeed, the empathy response may sometimes be involuntary, 
depending on the situation.165  However, this is a two-edged sword: on one side, it 
is helpful to our case, in that it strongly implies that if emotions drive morality in 
animals – in the form of, say, an innate sense of concern for others - this could 
enable us to sever the tendrils from the arguments from reason, language, 
personhood, and moral agency discussed earlier.  Before considering (near the end 
of this section) the ‘downside’ of this, however, it is worth looking at a few 
examples of how animals express apparent other-related emotional states that 
might have some kind of moral component or significance. 
A good proportion of the available research has tended to focus on the great apes 
– understandably because of their biological proximity to Homo sapiens, and also, 
perhaps, because they are often extremely vocal in their self-expression. We know 
that chimpanzees show sensitivity to distress or pain in other chimps, including 
situations where an individual has been the cause of that upset; while they are not 
shy in showing their displeasure, they can be also be remarkably solicitous in their 
apologies166and very demonstrative in kissing (literally) and making up 
afterwards167 – behaviour which almost irresistibly steers one in the direction of 
describing it as forgiveness.168 
There are recorded instances of chimpanzees and other apes grieving and shedding 
tears over dead members of their colonies, and being upset at seeing dead bodies, 
including those of other species.  (Koko, the gorilla had a pet cat and was visibly 
upset when it died.)169  Similar distress and mourning behaviour has also been 
observed in other species, such as elephants, whales, wolves, and domestic cows 
that have been allowed to live in natural herds or sanctuaries.170  Again, one wants 
to ask, what evolutionary point would there be in animals ‘acting out’ in this way 
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(or hiding away to grieve quietly alone), perhaps refusing food, or pining away for a 
lost mate, if there were no underlying emotions driving such behaviour? 
Of course, animal emotion is not all positive, and it is not unknown for animals to 
be angry or hostile to one another, but these are not necessarily random temper 
tantrums: displaying anger derives in part from the belief that one has been 
wronged in some way – which suggests that there is, at least among some animal 
groups, a strong notion of what is right and fair,171 and what one is entitled to 
expect from others.172  Perhaps most significantly, though, are DeWaal’s 
observations and recordings of chimpanzees apparently becoming agitated and 
angry during experiments when they witnessed other chimps being cheated out of 
their own food rewards – a phenomenon that DeWaal refers to as ‘inequity 
aversion’.173 
There is, however, a much darker side to emotional behaviour, which forms the 
theory behind the ‘Demonic Males’ account by Wrangham and Peterson,174 and 
which overlaps with territory previously explored by the Austrian zoologist Konrad 
Lorenz.  The thesis here is that male chimpanzees (alone among all nonhuman 
species) display the precursors of the worst traits of male humans in the form of 
extreme aggression and organised, gratuitous gang violence, with numerous 
chimp-on-chimp killings (murder, in human terms) being documented in the wild.  
Chimps have also been observed abusing and attacking other chimps from their 
own colonies who have evident disabilities, and they are also now infamous for 
their habit of hunting down and eating small monkeys alive despite the fact that, 
while they are omnivores, they are not obligate carnivores – they do not have to do 
this to survive.175 
Rowlands cites a particularly gruesome and upsetting account of a chimpanzee 
cradling a stolen baby baboon in her arms as she eats it alive, responding to the 
creature’s struggling and screams of pain by hugging it as though nursing an infant 
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of her own.176Given the physical similarity of the two species it’s hard to know how 
to square this apparently gratuitous cruelty177with the prevailing portrayal of 
chimps as highly intelligent, sensitive, empathetic, aware and even ethical 
creatures who are close enough to humans to have been considered recently for 
reclassification into the genus Homo.  The attribution of higher abilities to them 
seems to make the position even worse, in that it seems to point unavoidably to 
the uneasy conjunction of full awareness of what such an action involves, and the 
lack, or suspension of, the most basic form of compassion.178 
This certainly complicates matters, in that chimpanzees are probably the best 
candidates we have for honorary moral agents, on the basis of their good 
behaviour in general, but they also happen to be the only species apart from 
humans that deliberately kill their own species.  This is not to say that various 
animals do not display violence related to dominance and territory,179although it 
appears that deliberate cruelty or torture is exclusively hominidal behaviour and is 
rarely seen elsewhere in the animal kingdom.180 On the latter basis, however, we 
would have some grounds for saying that chimpanzees know what is right and 
wrong (for them), but on some occasions they behave in ways that suggest 
otherwise; they seem to have a kind of moral sense in many respects, but it’s not 
clear that they are consistently virtuous beings.  Indeed, Paul Shapiro suggests that 
chimpanzees’ violent and murderous ‘gang-attacks’ could be considered morally 
blameworthy181– an unusually radical view, but one that does seem to fit the 
available evidence.   If they are, as they appear to be, sensitive to unfairness and 
injury from others, and upset by the dead bodies of other chimps, it is difficult to 
understand how they can then resort so readily to lethal violence themselves.  
However, what we should not lose sight of here is that animals are not 
programmed robots – they can vary in their individual moral capacity just as we 
can: if they can be moral, they can be immoral too.182 
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The few examples given above are offered to illustrate the kinds of emotions that 
some animals seem to demonstrate in various moral contexts.  However, going 
back to the two-edged sword raised earlier (regarding the implications of emotion 
as a driver of morality), it is difficult to assess the exact significance of any kind of 
emotion from the outside.   And here, Dixon distinguishes between ‘thick’ and 
‘thin’ notions of virtuous behaviour – which refer to the substantive content of the 
motivational state - arguing that animals only show the ‘thin’ sort.183  It isn’t 
enough, she argues, just to identify similar emotional behaviours in animals and 
humans; we need to know their motivations.184  We need to identify a direct link 
between emotion and things that are valued, if those emotions are to be morally 
significant.  As she puts it, ‘Our alleged emotional kinship with animals depends on 
a conception of the emotions that is value-laden’, by which she means ‘emotional 
states that are conceptually connected to morality’.185 
In some respects, Dixon takes a view similar to Hume’s, in that she grants that 
animals have ‘simple emotions’ such as sympathy, but do not have a developed 
capacity for higher moral reasoning, which leads her to compare animals with 
children.186  And strictly speaking, it is true – we can’t prove that animals are being 
moral (or even understand morality) on the basis of how they act.  And one can see 
this as a particularly difficult version of the ‘other minds’ problem; as Dixon notes 
(with reference to Martha Nussbaum), to attribute emotions even to other human 
beings is to go beyond the evidence187– which suggests we are going still further 
adrift when we attribute them to other animals. 
In terms of formal argumentation this may be true, but it relies on the ‘disbenefit 
of the doubt’ card again: it undermines an evidentially sound but not watertight 
position by making that small uncertainty appear more decisive than the evidence 
used to support that position – and without offering an equally valid alternative 
explanation for that evidence.  While the inductive analogy to other minds of 
biologically similar type188 is not proof, it at least offers a measure of explanation 
which is not counterbalanced by the sceptical view. ( A similar kind of argument is 
sometimes used in relation to animal pain: as there is abundant empirical evidence 
that other animals feel and respond to pain,189 the sceptical fall-back position is 
that their pain is somehow less significant than our pain, because they are not 
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really ‘like us’. The implication of this is only thinly disguised: if their pain does not 
matter, we may continue to inflict it upon them.) The most sensible and fair 
approach (if we are to be consistent and to avoid speciesism190) is therefore, I 
think, provided by Masson and McCarthy when they argue that the standard for 
defining emotion and proving that animals feel particular emotions should be the 
same for animals and human beings.191 
 
Can animals at least be virtuous? 
The problem of self-scrutiny: 
At the outset of this essay, we noted the distinction between morality and ethics, 
together with the suggestion that some animals seem to behave ethically, as a 
good or virtuous person would (rather than according to a set moral code or 
system). It’s worth exploring this possibility a little more to see whether this 
provides a better idea of what makes them act for good as individuals. 
Initially, virtue ethics (literally, ‘manly habits’) doesn’t look very promising: one of 
its key tenets is that virtue has to be consciously acquired and practised as a thing 
in itself, to develop one’s character and judgement of situations, and to achieve the 
status of a good and virtuous person.192  This requirement seems to disqualify 
animals from the start; and indeed, for Aristotle, animals cannot be truly virtuous 
because (a) they cannot exercise deliberate choice and (b) they could not know if 
or when they were achieving this condition.193 This, once again, is part of the wider 
problem of the reflexivity (self-scrutiny) requirement, which seems to dog our 
every step – humans have it but animals, it is argued, do not, so they are unable to 
reflect on their own behaviour (the capacity of conscience), make properly ethical 
choices, or evaluate and control their own moral behaviour.194 
Challenges: 
At the same time, however, Aristotle’s system recognises the existence of ‘natural 
virtue’, a kind of innate but naïve sense of good which provides the seed of moral 
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virtue, which must be nurtured and exercised over time, like any other skill, until 
the individual attains their fully virtuous character in adult life.195 
Another relevant aspect of virtue ethics is the reciprocal nature of virtue within 
Aristotle’s system: the understanding that a person’s own moral development 
includes knowing what one is entitled to expect from others in the community. 
While this of course concerns human beings, one can draw certain parallels 
between virtuous reciprocity in early human societies and reciprocal altruism cited 
earlier in relation to social animals.  And what this suggests, I think, is that at least 
some of the perceived differences between animals and humans as moral beings 
relate to the enormous changes in human social organisation and scale, which have 
tended to distance humans increasingly from the natural world and organic 
communities.196  Indeed, this can be considered in relation to human ‘alienation’ in 
modern times.197  I will touch on this subject a little more towards the end of the 
essay. 
While it would be an overstatement to describe animals as virtuous in the full 
(Aristotelian) sense, this does not detract from their apparent ability to distinguish 
between good-making and bad-making situations, and how to perform good acts, 
within their limitations.  This apparent ‘knowing’ displayed by certain animals also 
bears comparison to the concept of phronesis (roughly, ‘practical wisdom’), which 
Aristotle highlights as a key ability of a fully virtuous person – to demonstrate 
sound, practical judgement in whatever situations present themselves.   While one 
could reasonably define phronesis as something like common sense or sound 
judgement, I don’t think it necessarily rules out more subtle qualities such as nous, 
experience, intuition, sensitivity, or even instinct, which are not easy to quantify.198 
This becomes particularly relevant if we consider that many (or, possibly, most) 
ordinary human moral decisions or acts are based not on cold analytical reasoning 
but on some kind of over-riding emotion or gut-feeling that is almost like a form of 
perception in itself (‘I just felt it was the right thing to do’; or ‘I just couldn’t do X – 
I’d have felt too ashamed’).  And in that respect we may be similar to animals; we 
don’t (or can’t) always give reasons for acting (although we may reverse-engineer 
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them afterwards in the form of post hoc rationalisation).199  Sometimes, in the heat 
of the moment, we may well act ‘on instinct’; but this need not be unintelligent or 
irrational, and may in fact result in the right moral judgement call.200 Indeed, 
practical intelligence in both humans and animals may be largely instinctual.201 
Again, this not to claim that animals must be bona fide virtuous agents on this 
basis, but to argue that the similarity here is too important to ignore; and likewise, I 
don’t think we are right to downplay the significance of unschooled, natural virtue 
(or ‘innate goodness’) in virtue ethics.  There is, I think, something amiss with the 
notion that the cultivation of virtue is necessarily superior to the simple possession 
of it in some measure (assuming that it is practised in both cases).  Voluntary 
‘untrained’ virtue is virtue nonetheless.202 We encounter a similar situation in 
Kant’s thought, in which natural kindness could be considered ‘holy’ but not 
moral.203 But is it reasonable to believe that a moral saint from birth could not be 
truly good, even if their innate moral ‘talent’ outshone the best efforts of those 
who had spent a lifetime trying to cultivate it? 
I think not.  But this is not to quibble over semantics for the sake of it, but to try 
and move on to, and also illustrate, what I believe to be the case, which is that the 
virtuous character or native ‘good-doing’ that animals seem to display is not 
something that they can attain because they already have it to a degree and in a 
form appropriate to their condition.  It is already an integral part of what they are, 
embedded in what they do naturally as an expression of their being, not an 
aspiration or an ideal as it is in the case of human beings.  It is the place of humans 
to seek and realise moral improvement in themselves, because they have both the 
capacity and the need to change and ‘do better’; as some have argued both 
seriously and in jest, animals, on the whole, have no need of it. 
 
Animals don’t have to be moral agents in the same sense as humans are: 
To insist on literal correspondence and parity between humans and nonhumans as 
a condition for morality, is, I think, unrealistic and unfair.  And, as Bekoff and Pierce 
point out, looking for the origins of human morality is not the same as looking for 
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morality in animals;204 and, by the same token, looking for animal morality is not 
necessarily the same as trying to establish animals’ conformity to a human 
convention or set of values such as that represented by virtue ethics. They need 
not display human-like morality or virtue; they need not consciously set out to ‘be 
good’, but can still act in a way that is good or ‘good-making’.  We’ll look at this 
from various perspectives here and in the final section. 
In ordinary factual terms, a dog voluntarily rescuing a child from drowning has not 
done something less praiseworthy than a human doing the same thing.205 But 
because we cannot know what the dog was thinking during the rescue, the default 
explanation tends to be that it was probably ‘just instinct’ – which (a) merely labels 
the action, and (b), assumes that the human acted on the basis of something other 
than instinct, despite the fact that we cannot (really) know what their moral 
motivation was either, regardless of what they might say about it afterwards.  But 
in the case of the human, we would be likely to think it absurd (although not 
necessarily illogical) to say that they noticed that the child was drowning but then 
suddenly decided to jump into the water for some completely random, unrelated 
reason, and then just happened to rescue the child in passing.  Yet this, in effect, is 
what we are being asked to swallow if we accept the sceptical notion of the 
‘unknowable’ motivation of the dog in exactly the same scenario. 
It might be objected that this kind of situation is more a case of instinctive, physical 
bravery being brought to bear on a practical problem, rather than an example of 
true moral dilemma; but one could also argue that any kind of morality boils down 
to whether or not we do right by others; whether we act for good or ill, whether 
we are kind or unkind.  And in this simplified form, I think the case for animals as 
moral beings could at least get a hearing – a position which agrees with Sapontzis 
when he contends that ‘straightforward, intentional acts to attend to needs of 
others should count as moral acts, regardless of species’.206  While many moral 
issues and attendant moral responses may be immensely more complex than this 
simple binary model, which, incidentally, relates to two essential tenets of moral 
practice in Buddhism and Christianity (that of ‘loving-kindness’207 and ‘love your 
neighbour’,208 respectively), there is not as far as I am aware a requirement that 
morality must be complicated and difficult to be worthy of the name. 
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If we can accept that latter point in principle, and not restrict morality to complex 
issues that can only be solved via abstract cogitation, then it can be linked with 
Bekoff’s crucially important and insightful contention that moral agency is species 
specific and context specific (in that different species have to work with certain 
kinds of moral norms or situations and not others) – which then implies that 
animals can and do make morally relevant choices in their own communities.209  It 
would be unrealistic and unfair to maintain that because, say, a rat or a dog is less 
intelligent than most humans, then its ‘moral quotient’ must be lower by the same 
degree as well (which would automatically make most humans ‘more moral’ than 
most animals, regardless of their actual moral behaviour).  It would, as Shapiro 
says, be unjust to demand higher standards from animals than humans.210 A better 
measure would be how closely this or that rat’s or dog’s behaviour matches the 
kind of behaviour profile that we would expect from that particular species.211 
 
Are humans really morally superior to animals? 
So far, we have proceeded on the basis that human morality is more complex and 
sophisticated than animal virtue in terms of its scope and presentation, and there 
seems to be little doubt that this is the case.  But do we have to accept that human 
morality is somehow ‘more than’ animals’ apparent virtue? Conversely, if the 
ethical simplicity of animals works for them and their kin, in what way is it inferior?  
One might say, for example, that animal virtue is necessarily externalist (in the 
sense that it is tied to straightforward goings on in the physical here and now, 
rather than in some abstract, hypothetical realm of moral ideas), but this does not 
mean that it is not virtue, nor that it is inadequate for moral purpose.   In ordinary 
terms, it is surely better to have a modest capacity for virtue which is realised in 
practice than a set of high-minded moral rules which are often ignored and rarely 
achieved. 
Humans are great devisers and champions of moral systems, theories and laws, but 
it remains to be seen whether this makes us morally superior beings.  I think 
Sapontzis understates the case when he remarks that the notion of human moral 
superiority is ‘open at best’.212  It is not just a case of our sometimes falling slightly 
short of our otherwise creditable moral record but that very many humans 
wantonly flout even that most basic of moral directives – the principle of 
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nonmaleficence (‘to do no avoidable or unnecessary harm’).213 Despite our much-
vaunted powers of reason, language and reflexivity, humans wantonly kill, torture, 
torment, mutilate and otherwise abuse other humans and other living beings on a 
scale we can scarcely imagine.  Indeed, historical accounts of astonishingly bad, 
cruel and depraved behaviour by humans have led some to characterise us as 
essentially amoral or even immoral beings – that we are ‘hypocrites living in 
constant denial of our thoroughly selfish nature’.214 
On this view it would not be unfair to diagnose humans collectively as a 
dysfunctional species, and various philosophers have said or implied as much.  As 
Christine Korsgaard expresses it, ‘I am… inclined to agree with Freud and Nietzsche 
– who characterise humans as psychologically damaged, in ways that suggest some 
deep break with nature’.215 A prominent symptom of this apparent break (or state 
of alienation) is the rampant abuse of the natural world in general and other 
sentient beings in particular.  ‘No species,’ according to Korsgaard, ‘is more guilty of 
treating those who belong to other kinds as ambulant objects than we are, and we 
are the only species that knows it’s wrong’.216 
This is not about levelling blame (virtually all of us are unavoidably implicated in 
some way), but to try and understand why this situation exists, when we consider 
humanity to be the pinnacle of evolution and the chief exemplar of morality, made 
(as some believe) in the image of God. Have we simply set the bar so high that we 
have almost no chance of getting over it – as Rachels might have been thinking 
when he noted the almost aberrant rarity of people who exhibit ‘Sermon on the 
Mount’ morality?217 Does the fact that we fall so far short of our own highest ideals 
mean that we only regard them as just that – ideals? 
I suspect that most people would not see it that way.  We do our best; life is 
complicated; we are only human after all. But there still seems to be a vast 
‘credibility gap’ between what we believe we are capable of morally and what we 
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achieve in reality.218It is not that humans do not, or cannot do good (and this is not 
being claimed here), but that despite all that we may know and care about as 
individuals or groups, the collective profile of humanity is predominantly 
destructive (the evidence for which is, literally, all around us), and on a scale so vast 
that we may not be able to reverse what we have already done.  And our collective 
response to human-made environmental crises such as global warming, pollution, 
deforestation and overfishing is largely pragmatic rather than moral: looking for 
ways to keep doing the same things but with some conscience-salving mitigation, 
rather than deciding to stop doing those things because they are wrong in 
themselves. 
 
To be fair to humans, however, we have collectively devised complex ways of 
combating our worst instincts and protecting the best, but to do this we rely 
heavily on external constraints and penalties imposed by the judiciary, armies and 
police, rather than the best instincts of our own good nature.  We must, 
apparently, be governed under sufferance.  But then if we are innately moral, why 
do we need all these things to rein us in?  Why can we not co-exist in peace 
without them? Are we, as Hobbes considered, rule-followers of necessity to protect 
us from ourselves?219 
 
There are, I think, good reasons, for saying that this is the case.  And this, I think, 
ties into what makes human morality different from the kind of native good or 
good-doing that characterises most other creatures.   Our ordinary sense of 
morality is intertwined with notions of power (or will) and reciprocity, which is 
implicit and explicit in, for example, Aristotle’s and Kant’s thought: for humans to 
be able to act morally the playing field must be as level as possible; we must be 
free to claim what is due to us from others as well as demonstrating that we could 
withhold what is due to them.  (And this is what makes ‘Sermon on the Mount’ 
morality seem so difficult and counter-intuitive.)  We can be good, as long as it 
does not make us weak, or unduly advantage the other – hence the need for 
overarching, complex moral-legal structures as we have in place to maintain this 
delicate, ever-shifting balance of power. 
 
I think human morality could be best described as both aspirational and ‘synthetic’ 
– not in the sense of being counterfeit, but in the sense of being produced 
artificially.  A side-effect of this ‘synthetic’ system, I think, is that our notion of 
morality is essentially related to this set of special behaviours we exhibit, which 
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seems to have a kind of exalted status in our daily lives, but from which we remain 
detached.  And this, I think, is where a kind of hiatus occurs – between our 
sometimes patchy observance of common animal-like decency and the advanced 
morality which we take to be an inherent property of humanity, and therefore ours 
as individuals by default.  In other words, on the back of this perception we 
estimate ourselves according to abstract and lofty ideals (religious and secular) on 
the basis that we understand and believe in them, whether we actually achieve 
them personally or not; but we tend to estimate and judge animals, not on the 
basis of their apparent good, but for falling short of the complex, elevated moral 
conventions that we may often find too onerous even for ourselves. 
 
Animals, I think, are better characterised as good or good-doers rather than being 
moral or ethical; and their good is informed by, and reflects, the general good of 
nature in an undistorted way.  This need not be read in an idealistic or mystical 
sense, but simply in the sense that nature overall seems to operate rationally 
rather than arbitrarily; it is not divided or at war with itself as humans are with one 
another and with nature.  And yes, nature is ‘red in tooth and claw’;220but – even 
without the capacities relevant to personhood – animals are otherwise generally 
tolerant of one another.  While they (necessarily) compete with others for territory, 
mates, food, prey, shelter and so on, they also seem to manage to be co-operative 
and benign on the whole; they seem to know themselves as collectives with similar 
‘interests’ and do not normally accrue more than they need, but only what they 
can use for themselves and their kin. This is not to credit them for choosing to live 
in this way, but to acknowledge that even their natural limitations place them 
beyond reproach. However morally inferior we may believe animals to be, at least 
(for the most part) they live their simple grassroots sense of good in a way that we 
apparently cannot. 
 
Importantly, as a number of other philosophers referred to here have said, even if 
morality turns out to be uniquely human, it does not entail human domination and 
misuse of animals.  While humans may be more intelligent and more powerful than 
animals, this does not necessarily make them morally superior, and nor does it 
permit the absurd leap to the conclusion that it justifies harming or exploiting 
them.221 
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Conclusion: 
 
Overall, I have tried to show that the main grounds used to dismiss the case for 
animals as moral (or good-doing) beings do not hold up – and fail to take account 
of valid empirical evidence to the contrary.  It is apparent that supposedly exclusive 
human abilities which are associated with morality - together with an abiding sense 
of self, beliefs, desires and intentional states - can be attributed to a certain degree 
to various other animals as well, which then suggests that there is no real 
foundation for saying that they would not qualify as moral subjects – if one wanted 
to insist that they must be categorised in one way or another, which I do not.  I 
think DeWaal captures it perfectly when he says that animal morality ‘occupies a 
number of floors in the tower of morality’.222 Animals do act in ways that would be 
considered moral if they were not animals; they are far more alert and responsive 
to moral situations than has generally been credited to them and seem to act upon 
an unspoken but consistent sense of ‘good-doing’; of what is expected of them 
among their own kind and within their own communities.  While we perhaps 
cannot accurately speak of animal morality we can at least speak with some 
justification of animal phronesis and a measure of natural virtue. 
 
This is not to say that species membership is irrelevant, but that it is not necessarily 
a decisive factor in moral standing, as Singer has already highlighted.  It is more 
appropriate and useful to focus on common denominators between species, not 
imputed deficiencies that create artificial distance between them and human 
beings.223 Animals do not need to be persons or full moral agents to act explicitly 
for the good of others, whether they understand what these actions mean, or 
whether they are morally motivated or not.  Besides, even if we (for argument’s 
sake) assume that they lack anything like moral agency it does not follow that they 
do not have moral standing.  Categories like those above are arbitrary and 
prejudicial, and tend to downplay the complex cognitive and social capacities that 
have been observed among various animal species, often by focusing not on what 
animals actually do in reality, but (rather like the tired old conundrum that a 
bumblebee cannot fly because it defies the laws of physics) on fixed beliefs about 
what animals supposedly cannot do. 
 
On that basis, it would make sense to dispense with the category view in favour of 
gradualist accounts, which are supported by, and tie in remarkably well with 
evolutionary biology.  We share much our neurological hard wiring with other 
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animals; and the human brain, though immensely complex, has structures and 
functions in common with ‘lower’ animals, particularly those associated with social 
interaction and interrelationships.224  Conversely, other animals have brain 
structures and associated abilities which humans do not, and indeed specialised 
capacities that are sometimes still a mystery to us - in the light of which, traditional 
claims for human exceptionalism look increasingly discreditable and untenable. 
 
In the case of animals, it is harder to separate out morality or virtue as such, not 
because animals do not demonstrate good-doing in some form, but because it is 
intrinsically bound up with behaviour that is natural to them, as a matter of course:  
what they are and what they do amount to more or less the same thing.  In that 
sense, we are in error if we want to argue that they ought to have some higher 
moral system which exists over and above their ordinary ‘default’ behaviour.  If 
they are already as good as they can be, to the best of their limited abilities, what 
use would human morality be to them?  How would they be improved by it? 
 
This does not, however, take away humans’ unique capacity for complex and 
abstract thought, system building, ideas and ideals, but I think it is mistaken to 
think that this is what makes us moral beings.  On the contrary, it is because we 
have that capacity that we inevitably apprehend and account for morality in a 
complex, abstract-theoretical way; but this is not essential to morality as such, or 
whatever good-doing equivalent for morality we might attribute to other living 
beings.  Animals’ altruistic or empathetic good-doing inevitably reflects their own 
simpler level of development, and will therefore be relatively simple in itself.  Their 
moral good-doing behaviour doesn’t necessarily result from human-like 
deliberation225 because they were never ‘designed’ to operate within the 
cumbersome human moral dimension, but they are, nevertheless, still driven by 
what we would understand as a form of honest moral intention, which is significant 
to them.  Ultimately, simply caring about and acting for the good of others (as 
animals clearly seem to do) is what matters morally226 – not merely observing or 
aspiring to theoretical moral principles or ideals. 
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